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Abstract 
The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games have stimulated discussions about the success of 
different sport systems and the Chinese model in particular. Revisiting explanations of 
sport in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe during the Cold War 
seems timely, as the current Chinese model of sport was largely designed after the 
Soviet example established in this period. This paper examines Bulgarian sport policy 
between 1945 and 1989. It employs a Strategic Relation approach (Jessop, 1990) to 
analyse sport policy making as a strategic relation closely linked to the dominant state 
project of building a new stateness. It goes beyond ideological interpretations and 
argues that the state represents a strategic terrain where these relations have to be 
established in struggles, the outcomes of which are always uncertain. Furthermore, 
past and present struggles and their outcomes create various socio-political 
environments that presuppose the forms of state selectivity and intervention in sport. 
The process of constructing sport policy was influenced by two main categories of 
strategic relations: intra-state, including political, organisational and personal relations 
between the Party, state apparatus and various sport and non-sport organisations and 
their managers, and transnational, concerning ideological, political, economic and 
organisational relations with both communist and western countries and international 
sport organisations.  
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Bulgarian sport policy 1945-1989: A strategic relation perspective 
 
Introduction 
The success of China at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games resurrected interest in 
popular and academic discourses about the communist model of sport, which 
delivered country‟s best performance ever with 51 gold medals in 17 out of 28 
Olympic sports. Many commentators, however, were quick to note that London 2012 
will not even attempt to match China‟s achievements both on and off the field because 
they could only be made possible by an authoritarian communist state. But as Jim 
White, a Daily Telegraph correspondent, remarked: “…Beijing has set the bar so high, 
London will get a crick in the neck just looking at it. You have been warned” [1]  
 
Explaining the success of Chinese sport, as indeed that of the former European 
communist countries, purely on ideological grounds obscures the complex and 
contingent relations and interactions taking place in the sport policy domain. It 
recycles an old argument about the omnipotent Communist party, which largely 
through coercion mobilises society and by manipulating its athletes delivers success. 
[2, 3, 4] This, of course, is supposed to be in contrast with the practices of democratic 
states. However, as a headline of The Times on the day after the Beijing closing 
ceremony stated “Threat to British Olympic hopes for London 2012”. [5] This brings 
to the fore a fundamental question about the role of modern state in funding elite sport 
against promises for a just society by creating equal sport opportunities for all. It also 
clearly urges the British Government to make a political choice in favour of investing 
in Olympic sport if British athletes are to be triumphant again in 2012. Interestingly, it 
was also The Times in 1913, which in an attempt to raise £100,000 for sending the GB 
Team to the 1916 Olympics, undertook to explain to the British public that success in 
sport requires time and money. [6]  
 
Using ideologically-informed analyses of sport policy in Eastern Europe during the 
Cold War at the expense of more in-depth studies is superficial and lacks theoretical 
underpinning. It is the aim of this paper therefore, to demonstrate that the reality of 
sport policy-making has always been much more complex and defies ideological 
explanations. The conceptual grounding, cultural forms and legacy of totalitarian 
sport have been detailed elsewhere. [7] This study therefore, addresses Bulgarian 
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sport policy during the Cold War period (1945-1989). It employs a Strategic Relation 
approach (SRA, Jessop, 1990) [8] to reveal the emergence of the new Bulgarian 
stateness, the evolution of state projects, concepts, structures and relations, and their 
effects on sport policy. This in turn allows the identification, conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of strategic relations in sport policy making. More specifically, the 
study pursues the questions what constitutes the socialist state‟s formation and the 
nature of its project and strategies; what was the impact of the socialist project on the 
conceptualisation of sport and its structuring and which were the state‟s key strategies 
and strategic relations in sport policy making. The paper first introduces the 
theoretical background to the study, followed by an analysis of the construction of the 
sport policy domain through state projects and interventions and concludes with a 
summary of strategic relations in Bulgarian sport policy during the Cold War. 
 
The state as a strategic relation: theoretical background 
The SRA examines the relationships between state and society in a Western setting. It 
provides an interpretation of the state that Jessop described as “a strategic terrain, as 
the crystallization of political strategies, as a specific political form which offers 
structural privileges to some but not all kind of political strategies”. [9] Jessop‟s major 
claim that the state is a social relation was substantiated by an analysis that saw it as 
the site, the generator, and the product of strategies. He asserted that the state system 
is the site of strategy because: 
it can be analysed as a system of strategic selectivity, i.e. as a system 
whose structure and modus operandi are more open to some types of 
political strategy than others... I believe this notion of strategic selectivity 
is more fruitful than that of structural selectivity because it brings out 
more clearly the relational character of this selectivity. [10]  
 
The state is seen as a generator of strategies in the sense that it is where its formal 
unity (as a sovereign state) and substantive unity (as the social basis of support and a 
hegemonic project) can be established. An important implication of this unity 
concerns the actions of the state as a united political force, where: 
...the role of state managers is crucial in understanding haw a relative 
unity is imposed on the various (in) activities of the state and how these 
activities acquire a relative autonomy from the conflicting pressures 
emanating from civil society. [11]  
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The structure and modus operandi of the state system can be understood in terms of 
their production in and through past political strategies and struggles. These strategies 
and struggles could have been developed within that system and/or at a distance from 
that system, and they could have been concerned to maintain it and/or to transform it. 
Jessop claimed that “in this sense the current strategic selectivity of the state is in part 
the emergent effect of the interaction between its past patterns of strategic selectivity 
and the strategies adopted for its transformations”. [12]   
 
The notion of strategic selectiveness is informative for analysing sport policy because 
it helps to identify the key preconditions for instigating the policy process (the pursuit 
of specific strategies), establishing two domains: membership (social identities) and 
structure (social relations). The SRA also informed analysis of the significance of 
specific historical settings in which state-society relations evolved and asserted the 
idea that previous contests form the conditions for recent/current struggles. The key 
features of the SRA implied the following: 
a) The state is a social relation, which has no pre-given powers or structure. 
Rather, it represents a strategic terrain where these have to be established 
in struggles, the outcomes of which are always uncertain; 
b) The nature of these struggles is the pursuit of the state‟s formal unity (as 
an institution) and substantive unity (as a hegemonic project), whereby 
different projects (including those for sport) are put forward by individual 
actors or groups trying to assert their interests and knowledge while 
competing for core positions in the domain and for greater privileges; 
c) If the state is the site of competing strategies, it is the state managers who 
act within the state system, thus their interpretations of the struggles is 
crucial for the materialisation of state policies; 
d) Past and present struggles and their outcomes create various socio-political 
environments that presuppose the forms of state intervention in sport; 
e) State strategic selectivity may be class, gender, regional and local, or elite 
and mass sport, and needs to be established rather than taken for granted. 
One aspect largely ignored by Jessop is that of global interconnectedness – the 
relations between transnational and local forces in shaping state and sport projects – 
important for sport policy during the Cold War. [13] 
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Despite some limitations of the SRA it was deemed appropriate to employ it outside 
western settings because of its analytical power. As the rest of the paper demonstrates 
the history of the communist period in Bulgaria provides ample evidence to 
substantiate the implications of the SRA. It transcends the traditional Marxist and 
popular ideological accounts of the former communist states in Eastern Europe and 
their sport policies as planned, centralised and ideologically dependent. In particular, 
it has argued that the state can be better understood if several important implications 
with bearing for sport policy are acknowledged: 
(a) state-building always occurs at specific historical conjunctures and involves 
individual and group actors;  
(b) state‟s emergence, development and separation from society should be viewed 
as a process of past and present struggles, that is, the state seen in motion; 
(c) states never achieve full separation/closure from society and their boundaries 
are usually in doubt;  
(d) human interests (the common will in societal terms) and sources of power are 
interrelated, and the outcomes produced in the course of agent interactions are 
predetermined historically by specific conjunctures; 
(e) conceived as a resource, power becomes a means to an end. The important 
question - To what ends or purposes is power put? - can be answered if, as 
suggested by the Strategic Relations Approach, we examine how projects emerge 
to promote the general interest which represent a balance of forces within and 
beyond the state. 
 
The argument here is that modern states are more likely to pursue their projects by 
engaging in a complex network of competition and collaboration. This urges the 
analysis to account for the relationship between state and civil society, and poses the 
question how powerful was the totalitarian state indeed? Weiss and Hobson‟s study 
on States and Economic Development helps us to understand the significance of 
various dimensions of state power. The study advanced the notion of the despotic and 
infrastructural power of the state based on the difference between its penetrative and 
extractive capacity. They identified three key dimensions of state power: 
„penetrative‟, which entails the ability of a state to reach into and interact directly with 
its population; „extractive‟, referring to the ability of the state to extract resources 
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from society; and „negotiated‟, which in today‟s societies is manifested in the capacity 
for co-ordinating the industrial economy, and involves strategic institutionalised 
forms of collaboration between political and industrial actors. According to this 
classification, communist regimes fall into the category of despotic (weak) states as 
they can generate only low-to moderate penetrative and extractive power. To explain 
this seeming contradiction of the omnipotent totalitarian state, perhaps it is worth 
recalling a popular folklore from totalitarian times in Eastern Europe: „they [the state] 
are lying to us for they are paying, and we are lying to them for we are working‟. 
Weiss and Hobson concluded that: “state strength increases with the effective 
embedding of autonomy, whereas state weakness ensues from despotic abrasion 
against society. This is the irony of state strength: the more autonomous a state is, the 
more isolated it is from social groups, with a low amount of economic and social 
energy created. Conversely, the more embedded a state‟s autonomy through 
supportive social linkages, the more economic and social energy can be generated”. 
[14] 
 
Previously secret documents revealed, as demonstrated by Claire Wallace and 
Raimund Alt, that cultural opposition to dogmatic totalitarian visions emerged in Nazi 
Germany, as well as in Soviet Russia and other East European countries. [15] This 
challenges the widely accepted notion that the communist states were identical with 
civil society. Most western commentators tend to view civil society as playing a 
mediating role between the citizens of the state and the power of state apparatus. It 
provides a counterbalance to the coercive use of the state power against citizens, and 
is perceived as comprising of groups of citizens in voluntary organisations. Brinton, 
however, offered a useful distinction between western and eastern interpretations of 
civil society. As he argued: “In the context of the communist regimes of Central-
Easter European under communism, however, civil society had somewhat different 
meaning…In this more Kafkaesque environment civil society existed in someone‟s 
living room, in the café, in the churches and even at jazz clubs at later years. It was 
the small space between the regime and the individual where dissent against the 
regime occurred. While it was much harder to define, Central-Eastern European civil 
society under communism proved to be a very powerful force that allowed citizens to 
resist the automation of life that the communist system created”. [16] Grass roots 
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sport clubs in Bulgaria represented similar „small spaces‟ as they were not directly 
controlled by national sport governing bodies, the central Sport Union or any party 
committee. Several examples further in the text support this argument and extend it 
beyond the civil domain to include the political as well, thus providing support for the 
application of the SRA in a non-western setting. Ian Henry‟s use of the SRA to 
analyse the politics of leisure policy in Britain reinforces the need for empirical 
analysis, regardless the actual settings, with particular emphasis on how policy 
change was effected, by whom, and reflecting which sets of interests. He noted that 
“the achievement of hegemony is never complete and the effects of strategies can 
never be wholly predicted. Thus empirical analysis of strategies in relation to leisure 
(or any other policy domain) is required”. [17] While the work of Henry concentrated 
mainly at transnational level, the present study examines strategic relation in sport 
policy at local, national and transnational level. 
 
Building the socialist state and its projections for society 
As result of the geo-political reshaping of Europe after 1945, Bulgaria undertook the 
task of building a new socialist stateness. On 8
th
 September 1944 the Red Army 
occupied the country, and facilitated a military coup led by the political group Zveno, 
which put in power a government of the Fatherland Front, dominated by the 
Communist Party. Bulgaria‟s strategic orientation for the next 45 years was decided in 
an arrogant “percentage deal” struck by Stalin and Churchill in October 1944 and 
sealed later by the Yalta Conference. This deal determined the USSR, Great Britain 
and the USA control over the Balkans. As a result, with 80% to 20% Bulgaria was 
placed in the Soviet zone of influence [18]  
 
Communist party‟s ascendance to power was chiefly guaranteed by the USSR‟s 
support. With a modest 15,000 membership and a weak working class of 300,000, the 
Party lacked the political and social resources needed to win such a strategic battle 
and to embark on the road of new stateness. Three critical implications regarding 
state-society relations deserve attention. First, a mass and deep transformation of the 
forms of ownership, from private to collective, occurred, which in turn changed 
economic relations and subsequently the social structure of society. Second, the 
introduction of the leading Soviet principle of inseparability of the legislative, 
executive and juridical powers opened the way for extra-constitutional forms of 
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governance, and later for the party‟s uncontrolled intervention. Third, both the 1947 
constitution and the new overtly Communist version endorsed in 1971 finally 
renounced the national ideal and its substitution by an ideological construct - the 
building of socialism.  As Velev et al (1997) put it:  
Bulgaria was forced by the ruling BCP to deny its national ideal, which is 
being declared „pan-Bulgarian and chauvinistic‟. The national clause was 
subordinated to the class struggle and sacrificed in the name of „socialist 
revolution‟. [19]  
 
Scokpol‟s (1979) [20] study of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions echoed 
this conclusion by pointing out the totalitarian state‟s rootlessness, neglect of national 
interests and contempt for utilitarian motives. From a political perspective, however, 
this tendency was not a novelty rather continuity. As the Bulgarian history evidences, 
similar to 1878, the political model of state construction was compliant with foreign 
visions, and only less contingent issues were left to the new state builders. 
 
The Soviet intervention was not only decisive in Bulgaria. It also marked a 
geopolitical restructuring of the world‟s political and economic balance and signalled 
the beginning of the Cold War. A new phenomenon appeared - the world Communist 
system comprising eight states in Europe, Cuba and some Asian countries - which had 
great impact on state strategies and policies for sport. Long term political (the 
Political Consultative Council of the Communist Parties), military (the Warsaw Pact) 
and economic (CMEA) treaties were introduced binding those countries to well 
planned and controlled patterns of development. Sport policies were no exemption. 
 
For 45 years, the building of a socialist society, under the leadership of the 
Communist Party, dominated the political and economic agenda. The state project 
presupposed pursuing three interrelated and contested processes: of capital 
accumulation (industrialisation), of generating social (political) support and social 
stratification (which could be seen equally as an aim and outcome). Sport was 
assigned an essential role in this project. The main political, economic and 
organisational mechanism for achieving this task was the omnipresent state Plan, as 
an epitome of the supreme knowledge possessed by the party-state and the socialist 
organiser. Most aspects of economic and social life were subject to planning and 
approval from the top. The logic of the plan presupposed setting an ever-increasing 
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spiral of measurable outputs and their over-achievement (mere achievements were not 
good enough). In sport, the plan represented a central plank of the concept of 
Spartakiade. This was a four-yearly nation-wide competition for the „best sport work‟ 
and all political committees, public, trade and voluntary organisations were obliged to 
take part in it.  
 
Bulgaria‟s rapid institutionalisation, combined with the ideological enthroning of the 
Communist party has led to the disappearance of any dividing line between political 
and administrative powers. From a strategic relations perspective, there were two 
important implications of this process. Firstly, it resulted in the state apparatus losing 
its independence from the Communist party, and secondly, in blurring the boundaries 
of prerogatives of the different state and public bureaucracies. The duplication of 
administrative, public and party offices destroyed actors‟ and agencies‟ sense of 
responsibility and competence. Sport‟s organisational and decision making structure 
illustrates the point. Party representatives sat on most sport governing bodies‟ boards 
at national, district and local levels. Strategic decisions, as well as staff key 
appointments, had to be approved by the supervising Party committee. Subsequently, 
sport organisations‟ performances were judged not by those whose interests they were 
supposed to represent - members and general public - but by the Party. 
 
Constructing the sports policy domain - state projects and interventions 
From a political point of view, sport was seen both as a subject and as an essential 
contributing factor for asserting the state project. In line with Marxism‟s socialist 
visions of sport, which were based on a profound disdain of body culture and the 
perception that it could only be viewed as a constructive leisure, sport had to be 
transformed to become a „people‟s movement‟. Subsequently, at the start, all existing 
sport organisations were labelled Fascist and their activities and achievements were 
disregarded and banned, while athletes had to join the Fatherland Front‟s committees 
and participate in building the new people‟s state [21]  
 
The shaping of the sport policy domain, as a process of establishing strategic 
relations, was influenced by four key contributing factors - the state‟s generic, 
utilitarian and specific sports policies, and the public sports movement. These policies 
were implemented through a complex ideological, legislative, executive and 
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clientelistic mechanism. These incorporated Communist party theses and decisions, 
parliamentary acts, ministerial decrees and measures, as well as sports organisations‟ 
struggles to secure greater privileges.  
 
The state‟s generic policies carried some important implications for the construction 
of the policy domain. In 1945 the new regime abandoned the 1934 legislation banning 
political parties and public organisations. In addition, the 1947 constitution 
guaranteed several universal civil rights, such as free education and health services, 
paid holidays, equal opportunities, state pensions, and freedom of association. The 
right to create associations and societies had to comply with a public order defined by 
the state and was further developed by the Persons and Family Act (1968). [22] 
However, with the advance of socialism nationally and internationally, this liberal 
approach was changed and a new law was endorsed in 1951 abandoning all pre-1944 
legislation. This law dismantled the normative basis of the third (non-profit) sector 
and laid the foundations for a new centralised and simplified structure by unifying and 
merging various associations. It also signalled the end of their autonomy and 
voluntary identity in return for state subsidies. This was about to change according the 
BCP‟s July (1987) Conception for Socialism, which was the party-state response to 
Gorbachov‟s Perestroika in the Soviet Union. [23] Despite its more open character, 
this document did not transform the ideological dependency of society from the Party. 
The sports movement response to the BCP‟s attempt at reconstruction - a policy 
document „Conception for a Profound Reconstruction of the BSFS - never received 
Party approval and was not even published for discussions [24]. 
 
State utilitarian policies with implications for the sports domain could be broadly 
divided into three categories. First, policies concerning the building of a socialist 
society‟s material base (laws and measures for urban and industrial development). For 
example, the Urban Planning Act (1962) [25] and the Industrial Establishments decree 
(1970) [26], both envisaged compulsory construction of public sport facilities in 
living areas, while the Council of Ministers‟ decree (No79 of 1961) [27] was designed 
to reduce state administration. Second, policies referring to people‟s general well-
being and the defence of the country, such as the Labour Act (1963) [28], the Health 
Care Act (1976) [29], the Military Service Act (1958) [30] and various Communist 
Party Congress decisions. These regulated universal civil rights and in the case of 
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labour legislations committed all municipalities, industrial and service estates to 
establish social and cultural activity funds to provide for pupils‟ and workers‟ leisure. 
Third, policies dealing with the moral and physical development of the individual 
encompassed by the Public Education Acts (1948, 1983) [31], BCP Politburo Theses 
for Youth (1967) [32] and a parliamentary decree for setting up a Youth and Sport 
Commission (No760 of 1968) [33]. 
 
Between 1945 and 1989 the party-state sport specific policies comprised more than 35 
critical interventions addressing a wide range of issues. These included two Acts of 
Parliament (1945 and 1948) [34], Politburo decisions and ministerial decrees 
concerning single sport development (e.g. a Council of Ministers (CM) decree No48 
of 1969 for wrestling) [35] and setting up of state structures (Committee for Youth 
and Sport - Politburo decision - December 1971). [36] Interventions varied in degree 
of concreteness, as some CM‟s decrees (No36 of 1972) [37] envisaged the exact state 
subsidy for sport allocated to each member of society aged 6 to 60, while others set 
standards of provision for elite sport (No5 of 1974). [38] The party-state intervention 
became gradually more overt and influential, which is illustrated by the 
transformation of the students sports movement. Professor P. Slantchev, the first 
chairman of the voluntary student association „Academic‟ (1947), explained:  
at the beginning Academic was a truly voluntary and independent 
organisation full of sport lovers. However, by 1952-53, it all changed due 
to political considerations as more paid staff were appointed, and the 
organisation‟s leadership became fully accountable to the local Party 
committee. Today‟s sport is not made by students [39]  
 
Table 1 shows the key state interventions in Bulgarian sport policy. 
Table 1. Key state interventions in sport policy between 1944 and 1989 
1949 The first Socialist Sport Act 
1949 Communist Party sets up Supreme Committee for Physical Culture and Sport 
1957 Communist Party sets up Bulgarian Union for Physical Culture&Sport (BSFS) 
1964 BSFS is given mandate by the Party to improve sporting excellence 
1969 Politburo decision on improving sporting excellence: focus on athletics, 
 swimming, gymnastics 
1971 Politburo decision: State Committee for Youth and Sport (CYS) set up 
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1974 Council of Ministers decree (No5 of 26/1/74) for improving Bulgarian 
athletes‟ mastery 
1976 National programme for Healthy Way of Life; CYS dissolved 
1985 Politburo decision to dismantle army (CSKA) and police (Levski) 
 representative teams 
1988 Communist Party‟s Perestroika attempt to reconstruct the sports movement 
 
Often, Party‟s political decisions had more powerful bearing on sport‟s 
conceptualisation than formal legislative acts. For example, a 1949 Politburo decision 
reflected the subordinate position of sports scholarship with regard to practice 
stipulating that “the curricula of the Higher Institute of Physical Culture and Sport, 
and the Ministry of Education have to be approved by the VKFS (The Supreme 
Committee for Physical Culture and Sport)”. [40] This nurtured an uncritical 
environment where sport policy making was largely immune from academic scrutiny. 
Virtually no academic analysis ever challenged sport policies and practices. This was 
strictly a party preserve. 
 
State generic, utilitarian and specific policies had significant implications for the 
sports movement‟s conceptualisation and structural relations, as well as for domain 
membership and agenda setting. The shaping of the socialist sports movement 
followed the general principles for organising society. According to them sport was 
assigned by the party-state to become a people‟s movement, thus involving masses of 
people in physical activities. This strategic project was accomplished by conceptual, 
principal and structural transformations which set the boundaries of the policy domain 
and determined its membership.  
 
Borrowing largely from the Soviet example, the first major step in unifying and 
centralising the governance of sport was the establishment in 1948 of the VKFS as a 
state-public body. Its mission was three-fold to: involve the working population in 
sport; increase labour productivity; and enhance people‟s ability for self-defence. [41] 
In addition, a number of voluntary sports organisations based in the main Trades 
Unions (those of the miners, builders, and light industry), together with four 
departmental sports organisations (for the army, police, students, and army 
construction forces) were also established. Gradually, two structural tendencies started 
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to emerge - a growing number of local sports establishments (from 600 with 170,000 
members in 1944 to 2,260 societies with 362,000 members in 1946) and a reduction 
of national governing bodies - from 24 unions and associations in 1944 to a single 
state agency in 1948. [42] 
 
The construction of the sport policy domain at national level was eventually 
completed in 1957 with the set up by the Party of a new umbrella governing body - 
the Bulgarian Union for Physical Culture and Sport (BSFS). [43] Despite its doctrinal 
and financial dependency on the Party-state, the Union (as with other voluntary 
organisations) was an attempt to join public, voluntary and economic potentials of 
society to achieve greater social and political results. BSFS‟s charter mirrored the 
founding principles of socialist constitution. Article 1 asserted that it is a “mass 
voluntary organisation of the people...voices the interests of its members, and creates 
conditions for expressing their aspirations and abilities in sport”. Furthermore, it 
claimed that the “BSFS is learning from the rich experience of the Soviet and other 
socialist countries‟ sports movements. BSFS is an inseparable part of the progressive 
sport movement, works whole-heartedly for enhancing the friendship between 
Bulgarian and the athletes of socialist countries...”. Naturally, sport people‟s interests 
were viewed as identical to society‟s interests as defined by the Party: “the BSFS 
realises its multi-sided activity under the guidance of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party”. [44]  
 
The process of structural centralisation of sport was accompanied by another essential 
step for classifying sports organisations, which shaped the core and the periphery of 
the domain in a truly decisive manner. Similar sport categorisations were evident 
across the ideological divide including countries such as the USSR, China, Australia, 
Canada and the UK. [45] The four major sports categorisations in 1949, 1958, 1969 
and 1988 were instigated by Politburo‟s decisions. These can be seen as a form of 
political and social engineering aimed at promoting sports with high utilitarian 
potential. Between 1949 and 1959 rational criteria included team sports‟ capacity to 
organise large contingents and generate support for the Party‟s committees. [46] 
Bulgaria achieved its major international success in basketball and volleyball in this 
particular period. The third classification in 1969 was rationalised on two grounds: 
sports‟ capacity to provide young people with basic training and military skills for 
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defence and to win international prestige. [47] Team sports were now harder to 
administer and sustain and less cost-effective for the system, thus not prioritised. The 
fourth reshuffling of the sports domain followed similar criteria and also included 
only single sports, although their numbers increased along the way. [48] The 
restructuring of the sports movement has had great impact on the distribution of 
resources and privileges as well as on agency‟s capacity to pursue strategies. Table 2 
shows the changing priorities in sports development. 
 
Table 2. Sports classification in policy domains instigated by Communist Party 
        1949         1958         1969        1988 
Athletics Basketball Athletics Athletics 
Gymnastics Football Gymnastics Gymnastics 
Basketball Volleyball Swimming Swimming 
Volleyball Wrestling  Wrestling 
Boxing Table tennis  Boxing 
Football Chess  Weightlifting 
Cycling   Rhythmic gym 
Shooting   Rowing 
Wrestling    
Equestrian    
Tourism    
 
Three more interrelated critical factors deserve attention in order to fully comprehend 
the nature of the sport policy domain: the principle of setting the sports movement 
(i.e., how to become a member), the nature of sports delivery and participation, and 
the international sports system. First, following a BCP‟s Central Committee‟s 
decision of 1948 [49] the sports movement was fundamentally transformed. The 
„territorial‟ principle, that is, individuals‟ ability to take part in sport by joining any 
local club or activity, was substituted by a „professional and departmental‟ one, 
suggesting that sports participation should take place predominantly where people 
studied and worked. Hence, a network of sport clubs in schools, factories and 
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institutions began to emerge. Gradually, a less limited network of sport clubs in 
residential neighbourhoods also started to appear.  
 
The key „production units‟ of the national sports domain, however, were not the clubs 
but sports societies (DFS-multi-sport clubs) established at municipal level. As table 3 
illustrates, the number of DFSs was well-regulated and exhibited the same tendencies 
of reduction and centralisation. In addition, after 1970 all DFSs were categorised into 
five groups according to a number of factors, including their contribution to Olympic 
sport. Those in group 1 and some in group 2 were assigned to develop elite athletes, 
whereas the rest (groups 2 to 5) were given the role of nurseries - talent identification, 
selection and initial training. By 1981 there were 19 DFSs in category 1 based in 12 of 
237 towns nationwide, but more than half of the districts (16 out of 28) did not have 
top teams or athletes. [50] However, despite their significance for the delivery of 
sport, no DFS‟s representative ever sat on the BSFS Executive Board. Membership of 
BSFS‟s working commissions was also strictly controlled. After 1981 there was only 
one chairman of a District Sports Council (out of 28 districts), four representatives 
from National Sports Federations (of more than 45 federations), and one active athlete 
(of more than 1,000 on the BSFS‟s payroll alone). [51]  
 
Table 3. Sports domain members at local level 
    1958    1965    1971    1976    1981    1988 
Clubs      9,000    6,000     4,800     4,500     2,697    2,600 
DFS n/a      951       924       991       324      276 
Members 420,000 n/a 608,663 758,194 938,270 n/a 
Source: BSFS I-VII Congress reports [52] 
 
Membership in sport organisations was supposed to be individual and collective. As 
clubs were not grounded in people‟s interests, individual membership quickly turned 
into a fiction. This issue for the first and only time was acknowledged in the BSFS‟s 
founding Congress report. It shows that from the planned contribution of 800,000 
Leva individual and 950,000 Leva collective membership fees, only 70,000 Leva 
(5.6%) and 617,000 Leva (65%) were collected respectively. [53]  
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Second, because membership in sport was collective, the main patterns of 
participation were also collective and their meaning, as a vehicle for promoting and 
regulating sport consumption, was limited. The decreasing number of sports 
establishments coupled with an ever-growing number of members supports the point. 
Sport participation was free of charge, except for some symbolic charges for a few 
activities such as swimming, tennis or skiing. Sociological surveys [54] and BSFS 
congress reports [55] claimed relatively stable rates of participation: between 25% and 
50% for school-aged youth, 10% to 20% for workers and 3% to 8% for peasants. The 
collective form of sport production-consumption offered only limited added value for 
the well-being of society because it did stimulate some job creation, but failed to 
diversify services or to enhance general satisfaction. 
 
Third, as the Party charged sport with the task of winning prestige for the socialist 
system, international contacts and competitions, both within and outside the world 
socialist system, became important. From a geopolitical point of view, however, the 
„Iron Curtain‟ which separated communism from capitalism, was an ideological 
façade behind which there were some important similarities and mutual interests. This 
is how the „Vodka-Cola‟ enterprise, to use Charles Levinson‟s eloquent phrase, was 
born. [56] Levinson provides ample evidence to substantiate his claim. For example, 
the average growth in East-West trade was 18 per cent compared to 11 per cent for 
world trade; some 25 leading Western banks had their offices in Eastern Europe; the 
overall socialist countries‟ debt to Western banks was estimated at nearly $50 billion; 
and in 1977 there were about 4,000 trade agreements between Eastern Europe and the 
West, of which 70 were active projects in Bulgaria. [57] The purpose of this joint 
enterprise was co-production where for example, individual workers and athletes from 
Bulgaria could be linked to their counterparts in Britain or France through the joint 
production of a car or an athletic performance. Girginov and Sandanski demonstrated 
the workings of the „Vodka-Cola‟ enterprise in British gymnastics both before and 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. [58] Similarly, between 1964 and 1983, the BSFS 
signed over 140 agreements and protocols (including governmental agencies) with 42 
countries, and 100 Bulgarian representatives sat on various committees in 37 
international sports governing bodies. [59] The co-operation between the Soviet block 
countries was considered essential and was multi-sided. This suggests that sport 
policies in the former communist states were not constructed only by Party directives, 
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but through complex domestic and international interactions as well. Bulgarian sport 
has made a concerted effort for integration in the world sport system and has both 
impacted on and has been influenced by global sport developments. 
 
Strategies and strategic relations in sport policy making 
Structurally and conceptually the sport policy domain was shaped largely by the 
socialist project and various state interventions in combination with global influences. 
Those had great effects on the pursuit of particular interests essential for ensuring 
strategic relations in sport policy. Two key strategic socialist sport projects - mass 
participation and elite sport - illustrate the process of promotional strategies and 
alliances. They are supported by two examples, the state support for wrestling and 
Sofia‟s bid for the 1992 and 1994 Winter Olympics. Each example represents 
different approaches used by various actors seeking to secure a place in the domain 
and for gaining more privileges. 
 
Table 4 shows the Communist Party‟s various strategic orientations and its related 
sports strategies. Clearly, the socialist project has evolved and its priorities over the 
years have changed. Strategic sport projects and mechanisms were shaped in line with 
that. The strategic political mechanism for ensuring congruency between party visions 
and voluntary sports organisations‟ responses followed a line from the Party congress 
to the BSFS congress. Usually, the BSFS would receive an address from the BCP 
Central Committee evaluating its work and providing guidelines for the future. In 
return, the Party-state offered various structural, material and moral privileges. 
Between 1971 and 1976 alone, 333 sport administrators and athletes were decorated 
with State Council medals and orders including the highest honour, the „Hero of 
Socialist Labour‟. [60]  
Table 4 about here 
Mass participation and elite sport were the two key strands of the BSFS‟s strategy. 
The former was supposed to generate much needed social participation and support, 
while the latter sought to gain political recognition for the system both domestically 
and internationally. However, it was clear from the beginning that the BSFS was not 
in a position to equally pursue these two projects with the available resources and 
structures. As the pressure for better results and effectiveness from the Party 
increased, BSFS‟ strategic response was further centralisation, tougher control, and 
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greater structural disintegration of mass and elite sport. This outcome was partly 
predicated by the territorial and departmental principle for organisation of sport, 
because BSFS did not have direct control over grassroots sports establishments. More 
than 95% of sports clubs were set in schools, factories and institutions, which 
financed them as well as 80% of sports facilities.  
 
Furthermore, after 1970 BSFS‟ main structural element, DFSs and sport Federations 
were given a mandate to focus on elite sport. [61] The lack of integration between 
mass and elite sport is demonstrated by gymnastics and weightlifting. For 20 years 
(1968-1988), with fewer than 20,000 gymnasts, Bulgaria won 30 medals in the 
Olympic Games, World and European championships. But from a national 
perspective, gymnastics could have been considered a mass sport, as during the same 
period some 4,000 weightlifters brought in more than 400 medals. As Gartner (1989) 
[62] and Riordan (1991) [63] pointed out, the public-good aspect of international 
sporting success bore more forcefully on centrally planned allocation decisions than 
the results produced by the market. After all, as the former head of the state and 
Secretary General of the BCP, T. Zhivkov, admitted in 1980 “we might not have the 
right resources to provide for sport for all, but we can always find some 40-50 
millions levs for our top athletes”. [64] 
 
Those examples indicate how the struggle for limited resources and privileges was 
shaped. As the BSFS had no clear commitment to its members‟ needs, its mass sport 
strategy aimed mainly at ensuring government actions on the political promises made 
by the Party, thus committing the state more to its project. In this regard, the Council 
of Ministry decrees No36 of 1972 ensuring a minimum annual state aid for sport for 
every member of school or working establishment, No63 of 1980 for improving the 
economic management of sports organisations, No3 of 1983 establishing the national 
fitness complex Rodina, and the inclusion of mass sport indicators in the state plan 
were considered huge successes.[65] In reality, these administrative measures 
delegated rights and responsibilities to other state and voluntary agencies operating in 
the domain, thus further blurring organisational responsibilities, and easing the burden 
on the BSFS.  
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The BSFS was fully aware that ensuring mass participation was beyond its capacity. 
All congress reports provided clear signals about that. [66] However, the only 
strategic response the Union was capable of producing, within its structural and 
ideological constraints, was to further centralise its activities and to exert tougher 
control. For example, the BSFS‟s 5th congress voiced concern about the Government 
disregard of the norms of the Council of Ministers decree No36 of 1972 stipulating an 
annual state sport subsidy of 6 Leva for every working person. It was reported that, on 
average, the allocated amount did not exceed 2 Leva. [67] 
 
Subsequently, the BSFS sought to encourage individual participation in residential 
areas but the proposed mechanism was a uniform state plan and a system for 
participation. [68] Similarly, the BSFS 6
th
 Congress was alarmed about the poor 
fitness of the population and the need for more individual sport services, as opposed 
to centrally organised mass activities. In this regard, some incremental measures were 
undertaken, including setting up health-consultancy centres. [69] These were health 
and sports authorities partnerships, a new entry in the domain, which proved short-
lived. The strategic response, however, was the re-introduction of a uniform system 
for participation and a central co-ordinating planning unit. Plan indicators (for mass 
and elite sport) for all DFSs were developed, but DFS were expected to „uncover their 
reserves‟ by surpassing centrally given quotas. [70] 
 
Elite sport was more attractive for all actors - from party functionaries to instructors, 
because it offered many tangible and intangible privileges. Although party officials‟ 
personal sporting endeavours were never publicised, their partialities towards sports 
and teams were well known. Mr. P. Kubadinski, a member of the Politburo, was also 
chairman of the Bulgarian Wrestling Federation and a keen supporter of 
equestrianism. Mr. H. Meranzov (BSFS vice-chairman 1963-1980), was another 
highly influential figure in Bulgarian sport and deputy head of BCP‟ CC 
Organisational department overseeing sport (1980 -1989). Meranzov recollected how 
in 1969 he secured a Council of Ministers decree ensuring more resources for 
wrestling. Until the 1968 Mexico Olympics, wrestling was responsible for 70% of all 
Bulgarian Olympic medals and still contributed 42% in the 1972 Munich Games. 
Despite wrestling‟s undisputed contribution to the country‟s Olympic glory, the 
Politburo decision of 1969 only identified athletics, gymnastics and swimming as 
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priority sports. The leadership of wrestling and BSFS were acutely aware that this 
could mean fewer resources and medals prospects and that they still had to compete 
for resources.  
 
After being categorically told by the Prime Minister that such a proposal for a decree 
for wrestling would not stand, and after failing to promote it through official channels, 
Mr. Meranzov went to see the chairman of the Federation. Mr. Kubadinski promised 
to persuade the head of the Politburo, T. Zhivkov, to sign the proposal first, which 
would then proceed without any obstructions in the Council of Ministers. And so he 
did - the decree was approved on the next day. [71] The significance of this episode is 
in the fact that, in the whole history of Bulgarian governments‟ interventions in sport 
there were only two special decrees regulating particular sports - one for wrestling 
[72] (No48 of 1969) and one for equestrianism [73] (No266 of 1975). It also 
exemplifies the significance of strategic relations between the Party executive powers 
and voluntary organisations for asserting their place in the sports policy domain.  
 
Another illustration of strategy and relations involved the most prestigious project 
Bulgarian sport ever undertook - Sofia‟s consecutive bids to host the 1992 and 1994 
Winter Olympic Games (WOG), launched in 1983. The bid was well-substantiated 
from a political, economic and sporting point of view. The 1980s was an interesting 
period, as Bulgaria made a serious attempt to rebuild, at least morally, its national 
identity, in sharp contrast to Brezhnev‟s doctrine for limited national sovereignty. The 
country launched a massive national and international campaign to celebrate the 
1300th anniversary of the Bulgarian state (681-1981). The ultimate goal of this project 
was to open Bulgaria to the cultural heritage of the world, and to promote the national 
culture abroad, thus raising national consciousness and transcending the boundaries of 
socialist reality. Sofia‟s Olympic bid was considered an essential element of this 
project. 
 
Despite the Party‟s decisions of 1983 and 1984 [74], the bid did not take off because it 
had to overcome three contesting interests. The first included economic concerns 
voiced by A. Lukanov (responsible for the Party‟s foreign economic relations) and the 
group behind him. Their arguments were very strong, not at least because the 1980 
Moscow Olympics incurred massive financial losses. In a conscious attempt to 
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prevent its success, those people ensured that the disagreements over the bid in 
Bulgaria‟s state apparatus are known to the International Olympic Committee (IOC). 
After all, state guarantees for political and economic stability were critical 
requirements that determined the IOC decision about the host city. The second critical 
concern was expressed by the Environmental Ministry and citizens of the city of Sofia 
living at the foot of the Vitosha mountain national reserve where the Games were to 
be staged. This concern was voiced by the member of the Initiative Committee, V. 
Josiffov, who was also chairman of the Union of Bulgarian Journalists. He wrote 
several critical articles about the negative environmental impact of the Sofia Olympic 
bid.  
 
The third resistance came from the Communist party‟s ranks. National and local 
officials (nick-named „local party barons‟) rightfully feared that an Olympic Games in 
Sofia would have severely cut budgets for local economic and social programmes. 
Moreover, the Games would have inevitably attracted massive material and human 
resources from all districts to the capital. The Party functionaries‟ reluctance was 
reinforced by the clientelism and nepotism of national politics. Once in power, most 
officials felt obligated and would abuse their powers to do something for their home 
place and relatives, thus securing greater local eminence. The erection of a 15,000 
seated stadium in a settlement of 4,700 people and building an Olympic standard 
swimming pool to serve a small village were just two examples of political 
cliaentelism. [75] 
 
Contesting political, economic and ecological considerations were dealt with by 
different strategies. These were elaborated by Ivan Slavkov, Chairman of the 
Bulgarian Olympic Committee (BOC), IOC member and son-in-law of head of state, 
T. Zhivkov. Slavkov went to see his father-in-law in his residence on the Black Sea 
and shared his concern about the bid‟s slow development. Zhivkov referred to Sofia‟s 
bid as „a political project with great significance‟ and as „fools‟ those who 
underestimated its meaning. He quickly ordered the preparation of a Council of 
Ministers‟s decision (No113 of 1984) [76] and the bid really took off. 
Environmentalists were disarmed publicly by selectively disclosing the hypocrisy of 
their claims. Slavkov published an open letter to Josiffov questioning his real concern 
about Vitosha, as the latter had his country house built in a preserved area on the same 
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mountain. Subsequently, Josiffov was sacked. [77] However, the contesting political, 
economic and ecological interests were indicative for the lack of unity, did the 
damage, and Sofia‟s bids for the „92 and „94 winter Olympics failed. 
 
The socialist period of sport reinforced the critical role of the state as site, generator, 
product and mediator of strategies, and blurred its boundaries with civil society. All 
significant sport projects were in line with the Party‟s programme for socialism, but 
some represented an attempt for a break with Soviet domination. Different groups‟ 
real concerns never became a factor in sport policy making, as it was believed that 
Party‟s interests coincided with, and best represented the general interest of society. 
 
State, society, interventions and power in Bulgarian sport policy  
The building of a new stateness was at the heart of the state project after 1945. It 
represented a structural-creative process with critical implications for the 
conceptualisation, structuring, production and consumption of sport, as well as for the 
strategic relations in the domain. The great transformation from capitalism to 
socialism began with a total negation of previous settlements and achievements, thus 
introducing a „new‟ strategic selectivity. The process of constructing sports policy 
was influenced by two main categories of strategic relations, intra-state and 
transnational relations. Manifesting the first category were political, organisational 
and personal relations. Political relations were established between various Party 
committees, and sports structures at central, regional and local levels, and proved 
critical for forming policies. Organisational relations involved dealings between state 
apparatuses - the Council of Ministers, Ministries of Education, Defence, and Internal 
Affairs - and central (BSFS, BOC), and local (DFS) sports organisations. They 
included also relations between voluntary sports and non-sports organisations - the 
BSFS and DFSs, Trades Unions, the Youth Communist League, at both levels. 
Personal relations proved also important, particularly in making strategic decisions, 
and for actors‟ placements in the domain. Of particular significance were nepotic 
relations (e.g., Slavkov), but non-kinship relations were also relevant (e.g., 
Meranzov). 
 
The form of the state and its basic structural mechanisms preconditioned the state as 
the site, the generator and the product of strategies. Individual interests and strategies 
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were largely subordinated to the general interest of the Communist Party‟s elite, but 
continued to exert influence. Although still illusory, this general interest was highly 
effective because of society‟s submission. The core of the state-sport project relations 
constituted an authoritative form and state structures imposed by foreign forces 
coupled with an uncertain process of capital accumulation. As grass roots formations 
and their members interests were traditionally excluded from policy formulation this 
turned the state apparatuses into a main source of support, resource and privileges for 
sport. What is more, the Communist state created a whole class of rulers. Claus Offe‟s 
useful distinction between „class organisations‟ and „policy-takers‟ helps to 
understand this process better. [78] Class organisations include those organised 
groups that play a key role in shaping an economy through their role in the market, 
and that seek to influence the state to help the market positions of their members. 
„Policy-takers‟, on the other hand, are those collectives shaped not by the market, but 
by the state, and are responsible for implementation within the framework given by 
the state. By 1989, this group in the field of sport was substantial and has reached in 
excess of 4,000 professional sport policy-takers (these were managers paid by the 
state, not allowing for technical and pedagogical staff). As this ruling class did not 
have a choice, its historical mission was to be in and to maintain its power. Sports 
organisations‟ uncritical acceptance of this relation made them tacit supporters of the 
notion of the general interest, as promoted by the state, and nurtured a culture of 
clientelism. This clientelism was just as strong but less oppositional than that of 
Greece, as demonstrated by Henry and Nassis (1999). [79] Interestingly, Houlihan 
and White (2002) also referred to the British sport policy community as „policy-taker 
and not policy-maker‟ because it was subordinated to more powerful political 
agendas. [80] Thus, the socialist state assumes a decisive role in shaping interests and 
behaviours, and does not confine itself to a mere ideological role. Yet, a large segment 
of the population, such as women and rural residents, were not fully integrated in the 
state-building project through sport. [81] 
 
The key difference between agents, interests and strategies in capitalist and 
communist environments is that while capitalism still influenced outcomes of 
struggles, the Communism inscribed all political and non-political agents in the state 
system. Subsequently, this predetermined their ability to advocate transformations by 
promoting strategies which did not conform to the general interest, as defined by the 
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state. As Nassis argued about Greek sport policy between 1980 and 1993: “the 
relation between the strategies of those agents and the sport policy system is said to 
be dialectic...and simultaneously may result in the reproduction or transformation of 
the structure of sport”. [82] 
  
The forms of state intervention were presupposed by the nature of the state project 
and had clear implications for pursuing strategies in the sport policy domain. They 
included how issues were recognised, domain was structured, general and sport-
specific laws passed, policy aims were formulated, key appointments were made, 
resources were allocated and controlled and how outcomes were assessed. 
Interventions varied in degree of concreteness and harshness, but most of them were 
imperative and did not invite an interactive participation of non-governmental and 
private agents. Indicative for this type of relations was the trend for centralisation of 
the sports domain. This was in contrast with state and sport administrations 
proclaimed concern for democratic set up and participation in policy making. 
 
The state-society relations determined the nature of power in the sports policy 
domain. Binding sports policy to the state project highlighted three important factors 
for constructing the social base of the state‟s power in sport. First, ideological 
justification with concerns ranging from defence of the country to improving 
individual fitness and well-being so as to appeal to wider social groups outside sport 
(the „hegemonic project‟ in Jessopian terms). Second, grounding state power in a 
strategic configuration of the non-governmental sport sector in such a way that it 
would always be supportive of the state regime. The state project never allowed 
voluntary sport organisations to unify in a collective body representing a powerful 
political actor. This was partly permitted with the forming of the BSFS, but only in a 
fashion strictly controlled by the Party-state thus, ensuring representative support 
without real mass backing. Third, a consensus over the means of channelling demands 
upwards and flows of resources downwards needed for establishing and maintaining 
the state‟s power in sport. The former was chiefly achieved through recruiting 
politically loyal sport managers, while the latter was ensured by political clientelism. 
Both depended very much on the placement of individual actors in the sport domain 
that is, on structural and interpersonal relations. The construction of state power in 
sport shed light on why the Bulgarian sport policy community was disintegrated and 
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dominated by key state or individual actors, and excluded the interests of large 
groups. The state power in sport displayed very little penetrative (the ability of state 
and voluntary agencies for direct intervention with the population) and extractive (the 
ability to extract resources from society for constructing a viable voluntary sector), 
and only limited negotiating (the ability for collaboration between state political 
apparatuses and sport agencies) capacity. 
 
Transnational relations included ideological, political, economic and ideological 
aspects. Although the English and Swiss concepts [83] of sport diffused in most 
European countries, they did not succeed in Bulgaria because they lacked state 
backing. Instead, the Russian sports doctrine, which enjoyed political patronage, 
penetrated and shaped the visions of Bulgaria‟s state and sport managers. Before the 
Second World War the international sports movement was loosely organised and its 
influence on national sport policies was rather symbolic. In this period Bulgaria was a 
member of only five international sport federations, and marked a modest 
participation in four of ten Olympic Games mainly in military oriented sports such as 
shooting, riding and fencing. After 1945 transnational sports linkages started to dictate 
not only the rules and forms of sports, but to offered various tangible and intangible 
benefits. Transnational relations were mainly collective including multilateral co-
operation between the Soviet block countries within the framework of political, 
economic and military treaties. The extension of the cooperation in the sporting area 
was critical for establishing state and sports projects. The shaping of elite sport was 
clearly influenced by the nature of the international sports system nurtured by the 
East-West rivalry. But the participation of Bulgarian representatives in various 
international sports structures was used more as a means of promoting collective 
socialist visions than specific national interests. 
 
In summary, three overriding tendencies of continuity, statisation and incongruity, 
pertinent to Bulgaria‟s sport policy, could be discerned. The continuity concerns the 
forms of state intervention and state-voluntary sport sector relations and domain 
constitution, which were similar to the pre-communist period. The continuity in sport 
policy was presupposed to a great extent by territorial and constitutional aspects of the 
state which were subject to complex geo-political struggles. The statisation of sport 
policy reflects a process of neutralising and channelling popular initiatives in favour 
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of continued domination of the political leadership. It involved a gradual growth of 
state apparatus in the sport policy domain as initiator, mediator, facilitator, allocator 
and controller of strategies. The call for more government was popular in the political 
and sports domains, and was promoted by the state and voluntary sports 
organisations‟ managers. As sports organisations never established a clear 
membership orientation, they could not rely on mass support. Therefore, the material 
and other privileges offered by the state were seen as more valuable and worth 
pursuing. It could be suggested that, together with the first trend of continuity, there 
was in place a process of active reproduction of social structures and the status quo in 
sport promoted both by state and voluntary organisations‟ managers. Gruneau 
identified a similar process in Canadian sport, although from a class struggle 
perspective. [84] The incongruity in sport policy depicts a lack of correlation between 
state sports projects and their outcomes. No outcome of a state sport project fully 
corresponded to what was originally envisaged. Virtually no strategic sports policy 
document was based on a comprehensive analysis of society. Consequently, policies 
failed to address the interests and needs of those who were subject to interventions. 
Strategic relations in the sport policy domain were formed around what was perceived 
as a priority by the state hegemonic project. An essential condition for promoting 
particular strategies was the placement of individual agents. Membership of sports 
organisations as well as athletes and private actors were not well organised, and so 






Table 4. State projects, sport projects and strategic mechanisms - 1946 - 1989  
                   State Project                      Sport Projects                Strategic sport mechanisms 
1946   Establishing people‟s power Assisting Fatherland Front to achieve power Dismantling old structures and relations 
1950 Setting foundations of a Socialist society Ready for labour and defence complex Specialisation, centralisation, bureaucracy 
1957 Building state socialism - the April‟s 
line 
People‟s mass involvement - sports 
classifications  
Command competition,  Spartakiades 
1962   Developing socialism‟s industrial base Sport into people‟s way of life-political image Centralised planning - further specialisation 
1966   Expanding socialism-improving living Healthy generations - builders of Communism Mass sport competitions-NSF focus on elitism 
1971 Transition to a developed socialist      
society      
Increasing the nation‟s vitality - sports 
mastery 
DFS‟s mandate for elitism, sport complex 
Rodina 
1977  Developed socialism-greater 
effectiveness 
„Mass sport, elitism, bright Communist 
virtues‟ 
Priority sports - Uniform system for 
participation 
1982 Total intensification-socialist democracy „Mass sport, elitism, bright Communist 
virtues‟ 
State plan for participation - Olympic standards 
1987   Reconstruction of socialism   Greater voluntarism and democracy in sport State professionalism, more sport services 
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